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Introduction
Alarmed by the increasing number of children in poverty, fe-
male-headed households facing severe financial hardship, and de-
pendents on welfare programs, Congress enacted a series of laws
that have attempted to shift the responsibility of supporting indi-
gent children from the federal government to parents.' This shift
was accomplished by requiring states to establish paternity, imple-
menting child support guidelines, and allocating the noncustodial
parents' support contribution to the states. 2 Although there is no
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University of Nebraska-Lincoln. J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1993;
Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1990; B.A., University of Maine-Fort Kent, 1986.
I am grateful to the editors of the Law & Inequality Journal, and especially to
Rahul Kale, whose careful and thoughtful reading of an earlier draft was particu-
larly insightful. Grants from NIMH and Columbia University School of Law partly
funded this research. Time was also partly supported by the Nebraska Department
of Social Services.
1. See infra § I.
2. For a summary of the federal enforcement process, see Brian L. Calistri,
Note, Child Support and Welfare Reform: The Child Support Enforcement Provi-
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agreement as to who will ultimately benefit from this legislation, 3 it
seems clear that there will be a new group of losers: fathers.
Although most agree that there is nothing legally or morally
wrong with shifting the burden of child support to fathers,4 few
agree about the extent of the support obligation. Congress has es-
sentially left the task of delineating support guidelines to each
state,5 a move which has had the unfortunate result of leading to
disparate outcomes.
For example, the Indiana Supreme Court recently held that
an unwed father has no obligation to reimburse the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program for money it spent to
sions of the Family Support Act of 1988, 16 J. LEG. 191, 192-95 (1990) (explaining the
history of federal child support enforcement procedures); Rebecca Burton Garland,
Note, Second Children Second Best? Equal Protection for Successive Families Under
State Child Support Guidelines, 18 HAST. CONsT. L.Q. 881, 882 (1991) (describing
congressional attempts to enforce child support with the 1974 social services amend-
ments of the Social Security Act and the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of
1984); Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility
and the Public Interest, 24 FA. L.Q. 1, 7-11 (1990) (detailing AFDC enforcement
procedures mandated by federal law, especially the 1984 Child Support Amend-
ments, which state agencies must follow) [hereinafter Krause, Child Support
Reassessed].
3. See, e.g., Calistri, supra note 2, at 194, 201 (concluding that the legislation
will benefit taxpayers and children); Krause, Child Support Reassessed, supra note
2, at 13-14; Harry D. Krause, Reflections on Child Support, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 99,
107 (concluding that attorneys and welfare administrators will benefit most from the
series of legislation). As we will see below, there is no agreement as to whether this
series of legislation will culminate in benefitting poor children, for whom the legisla-
tion was originally intended; or poor mothers, for whom later legislation was in-
tended; or the taxpayers, for whom the most recent legislation was intended.
4. There is nothing inherently objectionable about a welfare program which, at
some level, encourages natural fathers to assume support obligations which many
already voluntarily assume. Congress justified its early measures on the grounds
that all children have the right to receive support from their fathers and on the need
to deter fathers from deserting their families to welfare. S. Rep. No. 1356, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8146 [hereinafter 1974
Senate Report]. The Supreme Court has found these reasons persuasive. Bowen v.
Giliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987). It seems unlikely that the focus will be reversed. Leg-
islators and commentators have not been keen on departing from an historical
framework built upon an emotionally appealing, if simplistic, foundation: since the
natural father brought the children into the world, let him pay for them. Cf. Cham-
bers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1614,
1618 (1982) ("One jurisprudential foundation for governmentally imposed child sup-
port is remarkably simple and straight-forward: parents cause children to come into
being[;] .... having engaged in an act of their free will, they can justly be held
responsible for the consequences.") This is not to say, however, that legislators have
not attempted a rational assessment and accommodation of competing values-step-
fathers and grandparents have always been proposed as viable alternatives to pater-
nal support.
5. S. Rep. No. 387, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397, 2436. The federal government is now requiring that all states
establish guidelines for setting child support awards. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (1992).
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provide for children that were not his own.6 Without revealing its
legal reasoning, the court ruled that the unwed father's responsibil-
ity to his child was no different from that of any other parent simply
because the mother was on AFDC.7 The court simply stated that it
would be unjust to have a father support either children not his
own or a woman to whom he had no legal tie.8
On the other hand, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine re-
cently came to the opposite conclusion.9 The court ordered an un-
wed father to reimburse the AFDC program for money given to
support his child and its mother.1O The court reasoned that a fa-
ther, whether married, divorced or never married, owes a duty of
support.11 The court further reasoned that if the government
makes AFDC payments on behalf of his child and such payments
constitute necessary support for that child, the father can be re-
quired to reimburse the Department; even if the payments were
made to someone to whom the father owes no separate duty of sup-
port.12 The highest court of Maine concluded that there was a prop-
erly operative presumption that child support payments, even when
used by a mother and her other children, benefit the intended
child.13
6. Humphrey v. Woods, 583 N.E. 2d 133 (Ind. 1991). In this instance, the par-
ents were never married and the mother received $405 in AFDC payments for her-
self and her four children, only one of whom was stipulated to be the defendant's. Id.
at 134.
7. Id. at 135-36.
8. Id. A fervent dissenter argued that the majority worked a great injustice on
the taxpayers who would not be reimbursed for their AFDC payments to the family:
"In choosing whether the father of this child or the taxpayers of the State should
benefit, my vote is for the taxpayers." Id. at 136 (Krahulik, J., dissenting).
9. Wellman v. Department of Human Services, 574 A.2d 879 (Me. 1990).
10. Id. at 885 (affirming the trial court's order of payment). In Wellman, the
mother received $289 per month for herself and her child. Id. at 881. The father
contended that he should only reimburse $108 (the equivalent of a monthly payment
for a child alone) for each month that AFDC payments were made. Id. at n. 1.
11. Id. at 883.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 884. The appellant argued that requiring him to reimburse the De-
partment for AFDC payments made to the child's mother deprived him of equal pro-
tection because the "requirement treat[ed] him less favorably than unmarried
fathers whose children live[d] with a relative other than the mother; divorced fa-
thers; and mothers." Id. at 883. The court ruled that equal protection did not apply
because married or divorced men and those who had simply abandoned their wives
were not similarly situated to the "never-married Wellman." Id. It also found that
the statute, in theory, did not discriminate between men and women. Id.
The court further reasoned that this finding was consistent with AFDC statutes
that encourage:
the care of dependent children in their own homes.., by enabling each
state to furnish financial assistance... to needy dependent children
and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain
and strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to at-
1993]
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State courts also have been inconsistent in terms of arrear-
ages for which natural fathers will be held accountable. For exam-
ple, the Kansas Supreme Court found that a trial court properly
refused to require a natural father to reimburse AFDC benefits
given to the mother and child prior to the determination that he
was the natural father.14 In other states, fathers have been held
liable for payments made prior to that determination. In this vein,
a California appellate court recently found that a father whose
child receives AFDC payments is required to pay retroactive child
support to the state.15 The court noted that although no California
court had ordered retroactive child support in a civil case as a mat-
ter of common law,' 6 the father, in this case, "fell between the
cracks."17 Likewise, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found
that a trial court had the authority to order a natural father to re-
imburse the state for all AFDC payments received by the child and
its mother prior to the establishment of paternity.' 8
These divergent court holdings, as well as numerous others,19
point to the need for a reexamination of the obligations of poor fa-
tain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal in-
dependence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental
care and protection....
Id. at 882 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 601) (emphasis deleted). The court elaborated,
"[s]ince the person caring for the child must have food, clothing and other essentials,
amounts allotted to the children must be used in part for this purpose if no other
provision is made to meet her needs." Id. at 885 (quoting S.M. v. State, 297 A.2d
980, 982-83 (Me. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
Such interpretations have allowed courts to require fathers to reimburse AFDC
benefits given to mothers and children, even when the children are also living with
the father. E.g., County of Yolo v. Worrell, 208 Cal. App. 3d 471,477 (1989) (holding
that even though parents had joint, physical custody in that the father actually did
have custody of the minor child for half the time, the father was required to reim-
burse the state for AFDC benefits given to mother and child. The court reasoned
that the father was a "noncustodial parent whose absence trigger[edl the eligibility
for AFDC"); Washington v. Cobb, 194 Cal. App. 3d 773, 777 (1987) (where a father
who had custody of minor for more than 30% of the year was required to reimburse
AFDC money given to mother, even when the child was not living with her. 'Tlhis
statute seeks to recoup government revenue spent in maintaining the household of
the custodial parent even during periods of the child's temporary absence, in order
that the child may have a stable home to which to return." )
14. Kansas v. Baker, No. 62, 368, 1988 Kan. App. LEXIS 755, *6 (Kan. Ct. App.
Nov. 4, 1988).
15. Hobbs v. Christenson, 243 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638 (Cal. App. 1988).
16. Id. at 636.
17. Id. at 638.
18. New Hampshire v. Weeks, 590 A.2d 614 (NH 1991). The reimbursement was
ordered even though paternity had been established 14 years after the minor's birth.
Id. at 616-18.
19. Another example of a discrepency exists in the interpretation of the AFDC
provision that allows states to retain all but $50 a month of a father's payments in
order to offset the cost of welfare to the family. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(8)(A)(vi) (1992).
Despite this seemingly straightforward rule, what actually constitutes $50 has been
[Vol. 12:93
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thers, especially unwed fathers. This scrutiny is especially impera-
tive for three reasons. First, the Supreme Court of the United
States found the above deviations permissible. 20 Furthermore,
even when the Supreme Court has dealt with the question of
whether biological fathers have a constitutionally cognizable inter-
est in a child born to unmarried or married women, the Court has
not protected an unwed father's right to a relationship with the
child he is asked to support.2 1 Fathers, then, may be faced with the
unfortunate scenario of having no social/emotional relationship
with a child for whom they are financially responsible. 22 Lastly,
the subject of disagreement. For example, when Social Security Dependant's Insur-
ance Benefits is the source of a child's support, courts do not agree on whether the
$50 "monthly disregard" is applicable. Baylor v. New Jersey Department of Human
Services, 561 A.2d 618, 624 (N.J. Super. 1989) (the $50 does not qualify as disre-
gard, because social security benefits do not necessarily qualify as support payments
required to be disregarded); Lebetter v. Foster, 350 S.E.2d 31, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(social security benefits found subject to the disregard).
In Baylor, the reasoning behind not allowing the benefits as disregard rested on
the following distinction: the problem addressed by the child support disregard is
the collection of child support from absent parents, and "Children's Insurance Bene-
fits" simply are not part of that problem. Baylor, 561 A.2d at 623-24. The court,
using a rational basis test, found the above-stated legislative purpose constitution-
ally sufficient and rational enough for distinguishing between support payments
from an absent parent and benefits paid to a disabled parent under the Social Secur-
ity laws. Id. at 624 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987)).
States also disagree as to who is to account for attorney's fees incurred in re-
sponse to paternity proceedings. In Santa Barbara County v. David R., the court
upheld a statute that denied a putative father's recovery of attorney's fees resulting
from a successful defense of a paternity/reimbursement action initiated by the Dis-
trict Attorney. 200 Cal. App. 3d 98, 101-2 (1988). The court also upheld the require-
ment that, if a father loses, he must pay costs to the county. Id. at 102. The court
reasoned that,
However unfair and inconsistent we perceive this legislative deter-
mination to be from the point of the incorrectly alleged parent who
prevails, we conclude that under our tripartite system of government
such a determination is within the province of the legislative branch -
a determination with which we may not tamper... [we are] bound to
the law as [we] find it to be and not as [we] might fervently wish it to
be.
Id. at 103-104. The potential consequences of this ruling may be devastating. For
example, in San Francisco v. Ragland, an alleged father incurred legal fees in excess
$35,000 to fend off a paternity action when everyone, including the mother, the Dis-
trict Attorney and Judge, acknowledged he was not the father. 188 Cal. App. 3d
1375, 1378 (1987).
State courts, however, have found that indigent men are entitled to appointed
counsel in paternity proceedings. E.g., Caroll v. Moore, 423 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1988);
Kennedy v. Wood, 439 N.E.2d 1367 (Ind. App. 1982); Corra v. Coll, 451 A.2d 480 (Pa.
1982); Keeny v. Lawson, 484 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio 1984); Lavertue v. Niman, 493 A.2d
213 (Conn. 1985).
20. See infra § II A.
21. See infra § II B.
22. Some commentators have observed that little attention has been given to the
rights of the unwed mother. The rights of unwed mothers have decreased even
though she has borne not only the same financial duty of the father, but also the
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with current attempts to reform the welfare system, now is an op-
portune time to reexamine past efforts in order to develop a fair and
cost-effective system.
This article's analysis centers on the uneven extension of poor,
unwed fathers' legal obligations to include financial support for
their children's mothers and to children allegedly not their own.
This article begins with a brief history of the child support system
for indigent children and an examination of the legislature's rheto-
ric, as it grappled with conflicting societal forces. 23 Focus is placed
on delineating the rhetoric that attaches moral failures to poverty
and to unwed parenthood. The target of this rhetoric has shifted
from the illegitimate child to the unwed father. This article argues
that legislative efforts, by focusing on moral failures, have failed to
protect those for whom legislative inititatives were intended and
thereby have perpetuated a "dual system of family law:"24 one for
poor fathers and one for the rest of society.
The article next examines the Supreme Court's reaction to
this legislation. In the Court's analysis we find a continuation and
refinement of the rhetoric which serves as the linchpin for impor-
tant legal issues throughout our history. This section focuses on
exclusive responsibility to provide a home and family relationship for the child. See
generally, MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAw AND FAMILY IN NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985) (describing the historic development of American
family law in the nineteenth century and arguing that by the turn of the century
Amercian family law amounted to judicial patriarchy over domestic relations);
HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (1981) (ana-
lyzing child support laws and procedures at the federal and state level and especially
the establishment of paternity for children born to unwed parents); Mary E. Becker,
The Rights of Unwed Parents: Feminist Approaches, 1989 Soc. SERV. REV. 496 (ar-
guing that under a feminist analysis, traditional rules favoring unwed mothers in
child support and child custody contexts should be retained); Karen Czapanskiy, Vol-
unteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, a8 UCLA L. REv. 1415
(1991) (arguing that child support law should place an ungendered responsibility on
parents to provide a child with the support of which a parent is capable); John W.
Ester, Illegitimate Children and Conflict of Laws, 36 IND. L.J. 163 (1961) (discussing
legislative and judicial efforts to reduce formal discrimination against illegitimate
children and ameliorate the negative effects of their status, and further arguing that
in most cases there is no valid rationale for treating them differently).
23. In order to appreciate the nature and power of this legal rhetoric one must
first understand the history and cultural backdrop of its basic premises. See LAw-
RENCE M. FINEmAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 10 (1991) ("No matter what the for-
mal legal articulation, the implementation of legal rules will tack and reflect the
dominant conceptualizations and conclusions of the majority culture."). See gener-
ally, MARx KELmAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987) (arguing that judi-
cial decisions are essentially political and the many fundamental inconsistencies
within American law demonstrate that the principle of objective application of clear
principles of law is a myth and is impossible to achieve).
24. The phrase comes from tenBroek's seminal article. Jacobus tenBroek, Cali-
fornia's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status,
(pts. 1, 2 & 3), 16 STAN. L. REv. 257 and 900 (1964), 17 STAN. L. REv. 614 (1965).
[Vol. 12:93
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judicial helplessness: an indifference which abdicates responsibil-
ity and allows state officials to both allocate public welfare funds
and determine who can be required to contribute to the funds.
I. Development of the Welfare Child Support System 25
Commentators have observed that the basic and determina-
tive elements of laws for the poor emanate from the public assump-
tion of responsibility for poor individuals, and the need to conserve
public funds.26 In order to ration limited funds, the welfare system
necessarily makes distinctions between those who qualify and those
who do not, the poor and the non-poor. These economic differentia-
tions inevitably lead to moral distinctions between the deserving
and the undeserving, the worthy and the unworthy. 27
In addition to relieving misery, responses to poverty perform
the important function of defining and confirming status. Ideology
25. The following brief chronicle forcibly makes generalizations and
simplifications. Such generalizations about public discourse are tricky. Social
welfare history is undoubtedly complex, a product of many voices from different
historical periods. The article primarily focuses on the conservative, social control
aspects because it has proved to be the dominant voice. Progressive voices do exist,
but continue to be muffled. For an in-depth analysis and influential study of poverty
in America, see MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1963). For a more recent and liberal analysis, see CHRISTOPHER JENCKS,
RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY AND THE UNDERCLASS (1992); for a more
conservative analysis, see LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POuTICS OF POvERTY: THE
NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA (1992).
26. The most notable commentator to make this observation was tenBroek, who
wrote that the family law of the poor "derives its particular content and special na-
ture from the central concept of the Poor Law system: public provision for the care
and support of the poor." See tenBroek, supra note 24, at 676. His proposal, how-
ever, did not go unchallenged. E.g., Thomas Lewis & Robert Levy, Family Law and
Welfare Policies: The Case for a Dual System, 54 CAL. L. REV. 748 (1966) (arguing
that a dual system of family law - one for the rich and one for the poor - is not
inappropriate since the poor get at least a minimal counsel and protection of rights
while the rich rightly receive counsel and protection from the system because they
pay more).
27. LAWRENCE M. FREIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 89-90, 215-217, 448-
495 (1973). See also Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families With
Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 467 (1987-88) (arguing that an enduring principle of welfare
policy has been "that the failure to earn one's living was a moral failure."); Jack
Katz, Caste, Class, and Counsel for the Poor, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 251 ("In
modem society, poverty has been defined not only by quantitative measures of well-
being but as a morally distinct category."). For a more recent analysis of the immo-
rality attached to parents who could not support their children, see Donna Schuele,
Origins and Development of the Law of Parental Child Support, 27 J. FAM. L. 807
(1988-89). See also, Martha Albertson Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Dis-
courses, 1991 DUKE L. J. 274, 282-83 (describing single mothers as having been
lumped with drug addicts, criminals and other degenerates); Sylvia Law, Women,
Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1254
(1983) (describing the AFDC program as "Gratuitous Charity for Worthy Women").
19931
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and rhetoric explain a great deal of the massive disjunctures be-
tween the stated goals of welfare policy and their results.28 This
section focuses on the rhetoric of difference and deviance. By focus-
ing on the single variable of economic wealth and then drawing a
line on the wealth continuum, society and legislators create a class
of people who are "them," not "us." It is this creation of the category
of the "poor" which makes possible the assertion of their moral
weakness. To assert their moral weakness, "they" must exist as a
conceptually distinct group. Thus, when we hear legal rhetoric
about the poor, we often hear an underlying message of deviance:
we are normal, they are deviant. Their deviance is a product of a
single aspect of their lives, their relative wealth position. All other
aspects of their lives are either distorted by the label of deviance or
ignored. By creating this class of people, we are at once able to dis-
tinguish ourselves from them and reaffirm our own normalcy.29
American society has historically used a "worthy-person stan-
dard" to define status.30 The links between deviance, morality and
poverty were a dominant cultural theme reflected in early Ameri-
can legal rhetoric.3 1 In this manner, the dominant nineteenth cen-
tury cultural assumption, that the poor were morally degenerate,
formed the basis for the legal treatment of the poor during that pe-
riod. Such distinctions continue to this day.
28. See Murray Edelman, The Construction of Social Problems as Buttresses of
Inequalities, 42 MIAMi L. REv. 7 (1987) (observing that the rhetoric of public policy
constructs societal conditions as problems, and legislatures attempt to deal with so-
cietal conditions but are often ineffective because there is no realization that the
societal condition is a natural evolution and not a temporary problem caused by spe-
cial circumstaces).
29. Cf MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL Tm DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION
AND AMERICAN LAw (1990) (arguing that American law sets up distinctions between
classes of people in part to assert the preeminence of the dominant group); Martha
Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv.
L. REV. 10 (1987) (exploring this problem in the context of how the Supreme Court
approached gender issues in the 1986 term).
30. E.g., City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). In Miln, the
court upheld the validity of a New York statute that required the master of every
ship arriving in New York to report the occupation of each of the ship's passengers.
The court found that:
it [is] as competent and as necessary for a state to provide precaution-
ary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers . . . as it is to
guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound
and infectious articles imported, or from a ship, the crew of which may
be labouring under an infectious disease.
Id. at 142-43.
31. Poor parents were deemed to be immoral not only because they were poor,
but also because they were not able to support their children. Handler, supra note
27, at 470-71. This societal belief has a long history, as exemplified by Blackstone's
thinking, which emphasized the moral obligation (not legal), arising out of natural
law, of a parent to support the children they had brought into being. Id. at 467.
100 [Vol. 12:93
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Commentators argue that the poor in general, and poor wo-
men in particular, are treated as unworthy.3 2 It has been well rec-
ognized that a series of federal amendments to AFDC created a
dual track family law system that imposes costs on women 3 3 and
that the dual system is based on whether the custodial parent, most
likely the mother, is on welfare.34 A closer look at AFDC history
and the current AFDC amendments, however, reveals that the fo-
cus, use, and costs of the worthy-person standard have materially
shifted from the unwed mother and her illegitimate children to the
unwed father and his illegitimate family. That is, the new amend-
ments include the father among the unworthies and force him to
simultaneously contribute to public funds and receive the least
benefit.3 5
A. The Unworthy-Person Standard
Commentators often point out that AFDC's precursor, Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC)36, was intended as a program for the
"worthy."3 7 The ADC program was slipped into the Social Security
32. Amy E. Hirsch, Income Deeming in the AFDC Program: Using Dual Track
Family Law to Make Poor Women Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 713, 714
(1987-88).
33. Id. at 715 ("In the course of reducing income, [AFDC] also creates a dual
track family law - one set of family responsibility requirements for the poor ...
[and a] less onerous set of state family law requirements for everyone else.)
34. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 613 (1987) (Brennan J., dissenting) ("Al-
most 90% of single-parent households are headed by women, and a considerable per-
centage of them face great financial difficulty (citing U.S. DEPT. OF COM., BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARAcTERIs-
TICS: MARCH 1984 5 (1985))).
35. This is not to say that fathers have been the only targeted group. For exam-
ple, the new "grant group composition" rules, which deem the income of others in the
household as available to the indigent child or parent, are a clear example of how the
new amendments impose more extensive familial obligations on the poor than on
any other class. Hirsch, supra note 32, at 714-15; see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 602(a)(31),
602(a)(38), 602(a)(39) (West Supp. 1988). Although these rules are perhaps more
justifiable (at least as far as common law obligations would go), as the people are
either related or involved in an ongoing relationship, they still contain the moralistic
overtones reflected in the attempt to burden those most disadvantaged in order to
reduce the burden that the poor place on society. See Hirsch, supra note 32, at 715.
36. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, tit. IV, § 401, 49 Stat.
627 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617).
37. The usual starting point for such claims is Bell's treatise, which was an early
classic study of the ADC program focusing on "suitable home" policies. WINIFRED
BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN, 174-198 (1965). See also King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309, 313-325 (1968); Ronald J. Chilton, Social Control Through Welfare Legisla-
tion: The Impact of a State "Suitable Home Law", 5 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 205 (1970)
(describing an AFDC policy in which dependant children were required to live in a
"suitable home"; as determined by the state board. The "suitable home" policy
ususally forbade certain conditions including parental immoral sexual conduct, the
birth of illegitimate children after AFDC payments were initiated, and the abuse or
neglect of children); Julius Paul, The Return of Punitive Sterilization Proposals:
19931
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Act to provide grants to state pension programs that had run out of
money as a result of the Depression.38 The funds were earmarked
for widows with young children who were covered by the existing
state pension programs for mothers.3 9 Child support was not an
issue; the children's fathers were dead.
ADC continued to be a program for the "worthy." This restric-
tion was consistent with the congressional discussions of the pro-
posed ADC program which clearly stated that participating states
could consider a mother's "moral character" in determining eligibil-
ity.40 Children were disqualified because their homes were not
"suitable" (e.g., illegitimate children were considered as proof of the
mother's immoral behavior and unsuitability), because their
mothers were employable (black women were considered able to
work), or because they had "substitute parents" in the form of their
mothers' amorous relationships with men.4 1
Beginning in the late 1960's, the use of the worthy-person con-
cept was set back by two significant milestones in welfare rights.
First, the Supreme Court voided state rules that excluded "unwor-
thy" children who otherwise met federal eligibility criteria by claim-
ing that "federal public welfare policy now rests on a basis
considerably more sophisticated and enlightened than the 'worthy-
Current Attacks on Illegitimacy and the AFDC Program, 3 LAW & Soc'y REv. 77
(1968) (describing the policy of punitive sterilization which was aimed at "purging"
the country of undesirable classes. The practice regained popularity in the late
1960's and was primarily aimed at mothers of illegitimate children, especially those
receiving AFDC. The practice was part of a punitive action program that often in-
cluded loss of AFDC benefits, imprisonment or fining of the mother, custody loss of
children, or any combination of the above). See also Bernard L. Diamond, The Chil-
dren of Leviathan: Psychoanalytic Speculations Concerning Welfare Law and Puni-
tive Sanctions, 54 CAJF. L. REv. 357, 361-65 (1965)(describing how the attitudes
behind welfare law are closely tied to the emotions of guilt and fear. On the one
hand, efforts to protect the weak and poor benefit the donor, rather than the re-
ceiver, by easing the feelings of guilt. On the other hand, the very existence of the
poor and weak threatens the growth and prosperity of society, thus leaving the poor
and the weak as "nonpersons" for societal purposes. Traditional welfare laws achieve
an insecure balance between these two forces.)
38. Deborah Harris, Child Support for Welfare Families: Family Policy Trapped
in its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 619, 630-31 (1987-88).
39. Id. Although the statutory definition of dependent children in the Social Se-
curity Act also included children of divorced, separated, and never-married mothers
as well as children of widows, the state programs mostly reached only the latter
group. Id. See also, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-21 (1968); MICHAEL B. KATz,
IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SocLLj. HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 128-
29 (1986)(describing mother's pensions as the precedent and model for ADC and
finding that, as expected, most payments of mother's pensions went to widows); Bell,
supra note 36.
40. H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., tst Sess. 24 (1935), S. Rep. No. 628, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1935).
41. King, 392 U.S. at 313-22.
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person' concept of earlier times." 42 Second, Congress extended wel-
fare eligibility to the mothers of dependent children resulting in the
renaming of the program to AFDC.43
The welfare rights movement of the 60's and 70's, however,
was also coupled with a 37% increase in the number of children in
single mother homes, for both blacks and whites. 4 4 This increase
was not due to the death of fathers, but to changes in marital be-
havior resulting in their absence. 45 Blacks were increasingly less
likely to marry, while whites married but increasingly divorced.4 6
The increase in single mother families, coupled with the new Con-
gressional and Judicial directives, 47 resulted in an unprecedented
expansion of welfare payments to homes in which fathers were ab-
sent.48 Congressional concern with the increase in the numbers of
previously "unworthy" mothers and children on the welfare rolls re-
sulted in a series of AFDC amendments that have largely reversed
the progress made away from the use of moral standards during the
welfare rights movement of the 1960's and 70's.4 9
Commentators have often pointed to a deep hostility toward
the impoverished single mother household.5o These commentators
have shown that, as poverty became feminized and as images of
black, unwed teen mothers became fixated in the public conscious-
ness, welfare "reform" became more exclusive, miserly and harsh in
its effort to contain, deter and stigmatize. 5 1 Although this un-
42. Id. at 324-25.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 606(b) (1988).
44. IRWIN GARPINKEL & SARA S. McLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHIL-
DREN: A NEW AMEmCAN DILEmMA 49 (1986).
45. Calistri, supra note 2, at 192-93 ("Today, only about 3.5% of those receiving
AFDC have a deceased father: divorce accounts for 68% of single-parent families;
illegitimacy another 20%; and extended separation 8%.") The program serves over
seven million children. Id.
46. See GARFINKEL & McLANAHAN, supra note 44, at 51-54.
47. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
48. See GARFINKEL & McLANAHAN, supra note 44, at 114 ("In the first televised
presidential speech.., ever devoted entirely to welfare reform, President Nixon ar-
gued that the best way to stem the growth in welfare expenditures for families
headed by single mothers was to extend eligibility for cash assistance to two-parent
families.")
49. Id. at 117. For examples of the federal courts' progression away from the use
of moral standards, see Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1968); Gilliard v. Craig, 331 F.Supp. 587 (W.D.N.C.) affd, 409 U.S. 807
(1972).
50. Fineman, supra note 27, at 281-82. See generally Law, supra note 27 (dis-
cussing discrimination against poor women seeking work outside the home in the
context of federal policy).
51. Handler, supra note 27, at 460. Attempts to control the "unworthy" are not
new. See Chilton, supra note 37. To a large extent, criticisms have not advanced
much beyond views of earlier commentators who suggested that racial prejudice
played a more than subtle role in welfare legislation. Cf Paul, supra note 37. Nor
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doubtedly is a valid observation, equally cogent is the proposition
that Congress, influenced by Court prohibitions against basing
AFDC eligibility on the moral worth of single mothers and illegiti-
mate children52 and motivated by an effort to stem costs, turned to
the only other group which could be held responsible: fathers.5
3
The "new" approach to the welfare problem, then, would be solved
by privatizing responsibility5 4 and foisting the burden of the wel-
fare program onto "fugitive" fathers.
The perception has taken hold that an absent father, not soci-
ety, is responsible for the support of his children. In some jurisdic-
tions, the father is also responsible for supporting his children's
mother, regardless of his ties to her. The perception is clear: if the
father does not pay or pay enough, he is irresponsible and culpable.
Current legislative amendments well reflect the proposition
that an absent father's child support obligation has become the new
gospel. This new faith has all the moral trappings of the old. The
emphasis has arguably been more on immorality - the culpability
have we gone beyond what earlier commentators perceived as a deep, primitive, un-
conscious fear of the poor which translated into harsh attempts to control. Diamond,
supra note 37, at 361-65.
52. It is important to note that states have been able to avoid the King v. Smith
prohibitions and achieve the same result. For example, the King Court had held
that a state could not reduce a child's AFDC benefits due to the presence of a substi-
tute father or an unrelated adult male (UAM) in the child's home. King, 392 U.S. at
333. This was true regardless of whether a contribution from the UAM is assumed
or proven. Id. at 314. In Anthony v. McMahon, the court found that benefits to a
child could be reduced or eliminated because the state could consider the contribu-
tion of one of the mother's children's father's income to be available to the family.
No. F014826, 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 959, *28 (Cal. App. July 22, 1991). The Califor-
nia Court claimed that this ruling was not violative of the King holding since, even
though the mother and father were not married, the mother and father were consid-
ered related by having had a child. Id. at *30.
53. It would, however, be naive to think that welfare mothers are no longer being
discriminated against. Likewise, it would also be wrong to maintain that welfare
mothers have been the only ones singled out for harsh treatment. This is exempli-
fied by the passage of the General Relief program. Originally, recipients of General
Relief were the totally unemployable. Handler, supra note 27, at 483. One commen-
tator has noted that "General Relief was designed for the stereotypical male malin-
gerer, the bum. .. ." Id. at 460.
54. See 1974 Senate Report supra note 4, at 8145-50. The privatizing of respon-
sibility derives from ancient roots. See Schuele supra note 27. Family responsibility
laws, however, were not the product of English common law, but of Poor Laws which
imposed duties on husbands to support their wives, not their children. See Margaret
Howard, Relative Responsibility in AFDC: Problems Raised by the NOLEO Ap-
proach - "If at First You Don't Succeed.. .", 9 URB. L. ANN. 203 (1975); Daniel R.
Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under the American Poor Laws, 54 MicH. L. REv.
497, 498-99 (1956); tenBroek, supra note 24, at 258-91. But see R. H. Helmholz,
Filius Nullius: A Reassessment of the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REv. 431 (1977) (ar-
guing that although illegitimate children had no enforceable common law support
rights prior to the Elizabethan Poor Laws, they did have support rights enforceable
in the courts of the English Church).
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of the father - than on the needs of the child and the constraints of
the welfare program. This preoccupation with the absent father's
fault and irresponsibility, however, displaces awareness of the lim-
ited resources of many absent fathers and of the administrative
costs of "making them pay." Moreover, the congressional focus on
fathers is based upon anachronistic familial concepts; notions
which have become outmoded due to changing societal perceptions
of divorce and sexual behavior and a general relaxation of tradi-
tional familial bonds.55
B. Ferretting Out Unworthy Support Fugitives
The history of federal welfare programs demonstrates that
Congress and the states have increasingly relied upon the morally
unworthy standard in order to place the burden of welfare depen-
dency upon absent fathers. As early as 1952, the Notice to Law
Enforcement Officials (NOLEO) amendments required state wel-
fare officials to notify law enforcement officials whenever welfare
was granted for a child who had been deserted or abandoned by a
parent.5 6 Congress and most other observers, however, eventually
concluded that the NOLEO program was ineffective.5 7
Despite the legislation, in practice, American law remained
deeply insensitive to the enforcement of child support obligations.58
Congress relegated child support enforcement responsibility to
state welfare officials and required them to develop and maintain
their own program for establishing paternity and collecting sup-
port.59 Some states responded by cutting off welfare benefits where
mothers refused to cooperate in efforts to establish paternity and
obtain child support from fathers. These efforts were struck down
by the courts on the ground that the federal statute did not specifi-
cally authorize states to punish children for their mothers' failure
55. E.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981);
Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REv. 879 (1984); Herbert Jacob, The Changing Landscape of Family Policy and Law,
21 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 743, 747 (1988) (reviewing EVA R. RuBiN, THE SUPRME COURT
AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY: IDEOLOGY AND ISSUES). See generally Martha A.
Fineman, Intimacy Outside the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L.
REV. 955 (1991) (arguing that the "family" of the past is extinct because, in both
actual and ideological terms, the "family" structure has changed dramatically);
Krause, Child Support Reassessed, supra note 2; Law, supra note 27.
56. Harris, supra note 38, at 632.
57. For a history of the NOLEO provision, see Howard, supra note 54.
58. Krause, Child Support Reassessed, supra note 2, at 5.
59. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 (1968).
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to cooperate with paternity actions.60 The Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, however, gave the child support program
low priority and did not even monitor states' activities. 6 1
As mentioned above, pressure for vigorous child support en-
forcement grew as the welfare rolls increased markedly.62 In 1974,
Congress amended the Social Security Act by passing Title IV-D.63
The amendment essentially established the federal government as
overseer and standard-bearer of child support enforcement. By
197564 the essential features of the current welfare child support
system, namely compulsory participation and the assignment of
rights to the state, were added to the Social Security Act.65 By that
time, Congress had created the ideological framework for state wel-
fare programs. 66 Nonetheless, while creating the basis for the cur-
60. See, e.g., Shirley v. Lavine, 365 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd sub nom.,
Lascaris v. Shirley, 420 U.S. 730 (1975).
61. See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 4, at 8146-48.
62. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
63. The Child Support Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1974)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (1982 and Supp.
1989)). Title IV-D required the states to establish within their welfare agencies de-
partments devoted solely to child support enforcement. Id. The federal government
reimbursed states for seventy-five percent of the cost of administering the program.
Id. Compliance was assured by periodic audits performed by the Department of
Health and Human Services. Id. The amendment also created the Federal Parent
Locator Service. Id. In addition, it required custodial parents to assign their sup-
port rights to the states if they wanted to qualify for AFDC benefits and to cooperate
with the state in establishing paternity of the absent parent. Id. The provision also
allowed for a tax refund intercept to offset overdue support claims against the obli-
gor parent. Id.
64. Title IV-D was then added to the Social Security Act. Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88
Stat. 2351 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-667 (Supp. IV 1986)).
From that point on, welfare mothers had to cooperate in getting child support as a
condition for receiving subsistence welfare benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B) (1982
& Supp. IV 1986).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The required cooperation
has been described as an intrusive, kafkaesque experience. The recipient is at the
mercy of a seemingly arbitrary and chaotic system. For example, when paternity
has not been established, the mother must reveal her sexual history, subject herself
and her child to blood tests, and testify against the alleged father. If she does not
cooperate to the satisfaction of the welfare officials, she loses her portion of the wel-
fare grant. See Harris, supra note 38, at 621-22; Hirsch, supra note 32, at 729;
James W. Johnson & Adele M. Blong, The AFDC Child Support Cooperation Re-
quirement, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1389, 1397-99 (1987).
There are, however, "good cause" exceptions if the caretaker is able to prove
good cause for failure to cooperate. 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(26)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
Commentators have remarked on the low number of AFDC recipients who take ad-
vantage of the exception; a failure attributed to state officials who do not inform
applicants adequately of their rights and the government's failure to follow applica-
ble standards and procedures when assessing claims. See Mary Mannix, Henry
Freedman & Natarlin Best, The Good Cause Exception to the AFDC Child Support
Cooperation Requirement, 21 CLEARINGHousE REv. 339, 346 (1987).
66. This is not to say, however, that a growing "national" law of domestic rela-
tions did not exist prior to these amendments. A common, national tradition of gov-
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rent federal approach to children in poverty, the 1974 Amendments
left primary enforcement and administrative responsibility to the
states.6 7
By 1984, a series of significant federal amendments an-
nounced a more active federal role in the states' remaining areas of
responsibility.68 States were now required to sharpen their laws
and strengthen their enforcement powers. 6 9 The focus was on effec-
tive methods of support enforcement.70
By 1988, however, even more significant amendments were
adopted as part of the comprehensive Family Support Act of 1988
(FSA).71 Under these rules, welfare parents may no longer exclude
an independently supported child's income from the government's
determination of the family's welfare grant.72 As part of the FSA,
the legislature mandated that each state's child support guidelines
were to carry rebuttably presumptive weight.7 3
erning the family edsted prior to this time. The states had acquired a rather
universal law of the family, even before the Supreme Court became involved in "con-
stitutionalizing" the family or before Congress enacted the federal welfare legislation
of concern here. Schuele, supra note 27, at 808 (citing GROSSBERG supra note 22, at
17 ("In the nineteenth century, the states assumed the task of forging a republican
code of family governance."))
67. 42 U.S.C. § 652(a) (1988).
68. This is not to say that the federal government had not been active. The year
1981 ushered in the first round of welfare cuts, as contained in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). Its major provisions, how-
ever, were aimed at reducing or terminating benefits for welfare recipients with any
connection to the work force through their own earnings or those of a spouse. Sev-
eral requirements worked to prevent poor families from receiving AFDC benefits in-
cluding: monthly reporting, retrospective budgeting, reductions of earned income
disregards, and the imposition of stepparent deeming. Id. at §§ 2315, 2301, 2306, 95
Stat. 855, 843, 846 (1981) (respectively). See also Hirsch, supra note 32, at 729-730.
69. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98
Stat. 1305 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); See also Krause,
Child Support Reassessed, supra note 2, at 8-11.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (Supp. 1989) (requiring the states to recover unpaid child
support through wage withholding, income tax offsets, liens against property, etc.)
71. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified at scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
72. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1987) (citing S. Print No. 98-
169, p. 980 (1984)); see also id. at 619 (Brennan J., dissenting) ("[T]he Government
... has told children who live with mothers who need AFDC that they cannot both
live with their mothers and receive child support from their fathers.... It has de-
clared that, for an indigent mother with a child receiving child support, a condition
of her AFDC eligibility is that her child relinquish its fundamental constitutional
interest in maintaining a vital bond with either her or the child's father." (emphasis
in original)).
73. See S. Rep. No. 377, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 17, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2776, 2779, 2794; H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 988, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 91-92,




The result is that the financial status of a custodial parent de-
termines that of his or her child; regardless of the amount the non-
custodial parent pays in child support. Furthermore, the
Government counts child support paid for one child in a household
as available to each of that child's half-siblings. This contradicts
traditional state family law doctrines which base child support
upon the unique needs of the child for whom it is paid and restricts
its use to that child.74 Likewise, in addition to half-siblings, step-
parents and grandparents of indigent children are now presumed to
be financially responsible even though they have no legal obliga-
tion.75 Once again these presumptions completely counter tradi-
tional family law where neither were siblings obliged to support
each other; nor were grandparents required to support their
grandchildren; nor were stepparents generally obligated to support
their stepchildren.76
Several justifications have been advanced to support these
new amendments: reducing the budget, reallocating scarce dollars
to the most needy, promoting the sharing of income, and encourag-
ing families to gain autonomy.77 These justifications, however, are
quite malleable and readily provide facades for moralistic impulses.
In this vein, the policy of encouraging self-support and familial in-
dependence seems to contradict the rationale behind recent amend-
ments that allow state agencies to refuse to pay AFDC benefits to
teenage mothers who do not live with their own parents.78 Ironi-
74. Hirsch, supra note 32, at 715.
75. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 602(a)(3 1 ),(39). In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Con-
gress determined that if a child's parent was a minor living with the child's grand-
parent or stepparent, a portion of the grandparent's or stepparent's income must be
considered available to the dependant child. Id. If the minor parent is not living
with the grandparent(s), however, the grandparent's income might not be presumed
to be available. See also Morell v. Flaherty, 428 S.E.2d 492,494 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)
(discussing the impact of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 and its impact on grand-
parent deeming).
76. Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child
Relationship, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 38, 43-45 (1984). See also, Mary A. Goldsmith,
Note, AFDC Eligibility and the Federal Step-parent Regulation, 57 Tax. L. REv. 79,
94-95 (1978); Hirsch, supra note 32, at 715.
77. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 599 (1987). See also Diann Dawson,
Comment, The Evolution of a Federal Law Policy Under the Title IV-A of the Social
Security Act - The Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program, 36 CATH. U.
L. REv. 197, 198 (1986); Hirsch, supra note 32, at 731; Howard, supra note 54, at
203-209.
78. Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 403, 102 Stat. 2397 (1988). See also, H.R. Co~w. REP.
No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1407-08, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 2095-




cally, this policy of refusal was originally justified as a means of
reinforcing parental authority over wayward youth.7 9
The half-sibling deeming provisions did not derive from pure
motives either. They descended directly from earlier welfare re-
strictions based on "unsuitable home" and "man in the house" rules
which denied benefits on the basis of a woman's allegedly immoral
character.8 0 Grandparent deeming rules are perhaps the most per-
nicious. 8 1 These rules apply only when the parent is under 18
years of age, is living in the same household as the child and grand-
parent, and is related to the grandparent.82 Surprisingly, these
provisions remain unchallenged under the Equal Protection Clause,
although they appear to be legislative attacks on minority families
with matriarchal structures.
Although several "reforms" included in the FSA83 generated
considerable controversy,8 4 the most notable achievement of the
79. Hirsch, supra note 32, at 718 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1407-08, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 2095-96; S. REP. No. 494, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. 781, 827-28).
80. Law, supra note 27, at 1280; tenBroek, supra note 24, at 654-58.
81. See supra note 75.
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 602 (a)(39) (1984).
83. The child support enforcement provision constitutes the first title of the
seven-title FSA. The remaining titles of the FSA are devoted to, respectively, job
search and skills training, "workfare" or AFDC-UP, child care for parents participat-
ing in education and training, demonstration projects, miscellaneous provisions, and
funding provisions.
84. Perhaps the most controversial of these measures was workfare, which has
historically been one of the most bitterly contested proposals. Congress, and to a
large extent society, has long held that welfare undermines work incentive. Con-
gress passed the first major federal work program for AFDC in 1967. Social Security
Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 204. 81 Stat. 821, 1002-1012. Despite
the controversy, "[almong both liberals and conservatives, by the latter 1980's under-
class and workfare had become the key concepts in American discourse about pov-
erty and reform (emphasis omitted).' MICHAEL B. KATz, THE UNDESERVING POOR:
FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 233-34 (1989). Despite good
intentions, commentators agree that most of the poor mothers on AFDC cannot be-
come independent through paid work alone. Critics claim that the non-poor rein-
force their attitudes toward AFDC recipients through the process of "creaming";
whereby only those who conform to the expectations of the educated and skilled suc-
ceed in escaping poverty. Handler, supra note 27, at 519.
The early WIN amendments were a resounding failure in terms of reducing wel-
fare dependency. Handler, supra note 27, at 490. Despite that failure, and as a
reflection of the powerful societal belief that work is a way out of poverty, the
amendments were incorporated into the FSA. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343. For a discussion of the FSA amendments (JOBS), as
well as alternatives (GAIN, ET), see Handler, supra note 27, at 489-509. A recent
study of the way to move welfare recipients into permanent positions, though, lends
credence to the fact that the efforts may well be paying off. Jason DeParle, Welfare
Plan Linked to Jobs Is Paying Off, a Study Shows, N.Y. TmEs, April 23, 1992, at Al.
For reviews that see workfare as desirable, see GARFINEL & McLANAHAN,
supra note 16, at 148-50 (1986); Handler, supra note 27, at 462-463. For a not so
flattering review, see Law, supra note 27, at 1280. For a brief look at other reforms,
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FSA was its sharpened child enforcement standards. The stan-
dards were to be met by (1) changing the state's use of child support
guidelines, (2) implementing immediate wage withholding, (3) es-
tablishing paternity and (4) continuing to assign all support rights
to the state.85
In slightly more than one decade, fathers became responsible
for not only welfare children (even if they weren't their own) but
also mothers (even if they had no legal relationship to them). The
political rhetoric of the 60's and early 70's about ending poverty was
replaced with political rhetoric about ending welfare dependency by
essentially switching the burden of dependency onto fathers.
To understand the switch, one must understand its thrust.
When Congress enacted sweeping legislation to strengthen enforce-
ment of child support obligations, its primary goal was to reduce
the federal cost of the AFDC program.8 6 When the blueprint was
formed, however, there were essentially no data to support the
claim that fathers could be made to pay enough to reduce welfare
costs.8 7 Although being tough about child support can only have a
negligible impact on welfare families because of the small earnings
of fathers,88 Congress nevertheless concluded that financial respon-
sibility for welfare children could be transferred from the govern-
ment to the children's fathers. Commentators, even those who were
at the forefront of the effort to make fathers responsible, now la-
ment this strategic move. They now claim that the current empha-
sis on enforcing fathers' obligations clouds our judgement about
how much money we can realistically expect fathers to provide.
Such efforts are simply not cost effective,8 9 as we will see below.
see Robert D. Reischauer, Welfare Reform: Will Consensus Be Enough? BROOmINGS
REV. 3-8 (1987).
85. See supra note 2.
86. Krause, Child Support Reassessed, supra note 2, at 6; Calistri, supra note 2,
at 191.
87. The 1974 Senate Report, which contains the basic outlines of the present
welfare child support requirements, cited only one study. 1974 Senate Report, supra
note 4, at 8145-47 (citing Nonsupport of Legitimate Children by Affluent Fathers as a
Cause of Poverty and Welfare Dependence). The cited article did not deal with the
potential for support collections from poor fathers or from fathers of illegitimate chil-
dren who were prompting the increasing concern. Id.
88. Handler, supra note 27, at 511 ("Of all the mothers in poverty, less than one-
third [aire awarded child support, and of this group, minorities, the less well edu-
cated, and the young [aire even worse off.").
89. See Harris, supra note 38, at 635-41; Krause, Child Support Reassessed
supra note 2, at 422-31; Philip K Robins, 76 Am. ECON. REv. 768 (1986) (child sup-





Why does the system persist despite its economic ineffective-
ness and despite the avowed effort to save public funds? Two rea-
sons are particularly relevant as they are central aspects of
congressional efforts to reform the welfare system. One is the
seemingly ingrained belief that the Government can make welfare
cost effective by devising better support collection methods. The
other is the notion that fathers should be made to support their
children regardless of the administrative cost.
In its recent reform effort, Congress maintained that most of
the welfare savings would be realized through four improvements
in the child support system.90 The potential cost-effectiveness of
these reforms, however, has received considerable scrutiny.
The first reform, child support guidelines, was intended to in-
crease the adequacy of child support orders and improve the consis-
tency and predictability of child support awards.91 Nonetheless,
commentators report that welfare children are not being helped,
and that support may actually decrease. 9 2 Commentators have
90. See supra text accompanying note 85.
91. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The guidelines were based upon
studies which pointed to inequities in setting child support amounts. See Charles
David Creech, Note, Legislating Responsibility: North Carolina's New Child Sup-
port Enforcement Acts, 65 N.C.L. REv. 1354, 1357 (1987); William H. Douglas, Fac-
tors in Determining Child Support, 1985 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 27, 27-28 (Special Issue);
Sally F. Goldfarb, Child Support Guidelines: A Model for Fair Allocation of Child
Care, Medical, and Educational Expenses, 21 FAM. L.Q. 325, 326 (1987); Robert G.
Williams, Guidelines for Setting Levels of Child Support Orders, 21 FAM. L.Q. 281,
282-86 (1987). These studies and the resulting legislation, however, were seriously
limited in that they only referred to consistency in setting child support obligations.
This is apparently because the thrust behind the guidelines was the fear that judges
would set inadequate awards. These fears were justified. Peter Leehy, Note, The
Child Support Standards Act and the New York Judiciary: Fortifying the 17 Percent
Solution, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1299, 1304-05 (1991). See also Carol S. Bruch, Develop-
ing Standards for Child Support Payments: A Critique of Current Practice, 16 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 49, 54-56 (1982); Lucy M. Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support
Cases: An Empirical Study of Establishment and Enforcement of Uniform Support
Orders in the Denver District Court, 57 DENY. L.J. 21, 21-23 (1979). Perhaps because
of this overriding concern, they did not include important considerations; they failed
to establish who should have the obligations and what should be considered as in-
come. Judith M. Billings, From Guesswork to Guidelines - The Adoption of Uni-
form Child Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 859, 861-63.
92. Harris, supra note 38, at 644. The major reason is that fathers of children on
welfare have incomes which are less than 60% of the average income of men in the
United States. Garfinkel has reported that the use of mandatory awards even ended
up in lowering awards for low income fathers. IRwiN GARFINKEL, UTILIZATION AND
EFFECTS OF IMMEDIATE INCOME WITHHOLDING AND THE PERCENTAGE-OF-INCOME STAN-
DARD: AN INTERIM REPORT ON THE CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE DEMONSTRATION 19,
table 6 (1986). See generally Krause, Child Support Reassessed, supra note 2 (re-
porting studies show that many fathers are unable to provide the support their chil-
dren need to get a decent start in life).
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found the second reform, wage withholding, to be equally ineffective
as the instability of employment, compounded by low paying em-
ployment, results in low collections from low income fathers.9 3 The
third reform, paternity establishment, has also been relentlessly
criticized as the least effective way to offset welfare costs. 9 4 The
last reform, assigning support money to the state, has received op-
position from poor women and commentators.9 5 Nevertheless, this
93. Harris, supra note 38, at 647-48. Some commentators have demonstrated
how child support has turned into an income transfer program from poor fathers to
lawyers and welfare bureaucrats. Krause, Child Support Reassessed supra note 2,
at 13-14; Krause, Reflections on Child Support, supra note 3, at 106-11. See also
Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Supporting Children After Divorce: The Influ-
ence of Custody on Support Levels and Payments, 22 FAm. L.Q. 319, 337 (1988) (con-
cluding that the major factor predicting the payment of child support was
employment stability; the second predictor was the relationship between the two
parents).
94. In terms of welfare expenditure, the most expensive cases are those in which
paternity must be established. Cf. Greg J. Duncan, Martha S. Hill & Saul D. Hoff-
man, Welfare Dependence Within and Across Generation, 239 SCIENCE 467, 468
(1988) (the greater incidence of long-term receipt of welfare by never-married
mothers of young children suggests that paternity establishment may generate col-
lections over time). But cf Harris, supra note 38, at 649 (collections in these cases
remain the lowest, effort should be placed on collections that would be more cost
effective, especially given these fathers' lack of ability to pay). See generally, Paula
Roberts, Child Support and Beyond: Mapping a Future for America's Low-Income
Children, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 594, 597 (1988) (discussing the European model
for providing family or children's allowance).
95. E.g., Virginia Cartoof, The Negative Effects of AFDC Policies on Teenage
Mothers, 61 CHILD WELFARE 269 (1982); Krause, Reflections on Child Support, supra
note 3. Women receiving AFDC oppose child support enforcement for several rea-
sons. Id. at 102. Some argue that enforcement eliminates unreported, voluntary
contributions by fathers which results in the alienation of the father and the loss of
emotional support. Others argue that they prefer to have no contact whatsoever
with the fathers. Id. But see Cecilia Rivera-Casale, Lorraine V. Klerman & Roger
Manela, The Relevance of Child-Support Enforcement to School-Age Parents, 63
CmLD WELFARE 521 (1984) (arguing that obligations for economic support should
even be extended to the teenage father's families).
Others argue that, unlike the voluntary system where the mother may avoid
custody battles by not bringing support actions against the father, the welfare sup-
port system places mothers in a precarious position if the fathers decide to retaliate
and counter-sue for custody and/or increased visitation. Harris, supra note 38, at
624. The mother, forced into the support proceeding, is left hanging when the father
brings a counter-claim. See Paula Roberts & Michael Allen, An AFDC Mother's
Right to Counsel: Custody Issues in Proceedings Instigated by the IV-D Agency, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 278 (1985); Paula Roberts, In the Frying Pan and in the Fire:
AFDC Custodial Parents and the IV-D System, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1407 (1985).
This is perhaps one of the few instances in which the mother has a higher chance of
losing the custody battle. Recent studies indicate that these mothers lose anywhere
from half to two-thirds of all litigated custody disputes. The welfare mother is likely
to be seen as the least desirable custodian; she again becomes a victim of both eco-
nomic discrimination and double standards as to what constitutes a "good" mother.
See e.g., NATtONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAw, Sex and Economic Discrimi-
nation in Child Custody Awards, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 278 (1985); Jeff Atkinson,
Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q.
1 (1984); CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL (1986); Hirsch, supra note 32, at 725-27.
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reform was continued in order to insure that the system was "effec-
tive"96 enough to protect mothers,97 and to make sure that all wel-
fare families were subjected to the support requirements.
These child support reforms have been championed as leading
to a number of social benefits including: encouraging the idea that
unmarried men are responsible for the consequences of their behav-
ior; reducing the stigma of illegitimacy and giving illegitimate chil-
dren a sense of identity; increasing children's opportunities to
develop relationships with their fathers; improving children's
health prospects by enabling them to learn their fathers' health his-
tories; providing fathers with opportunities to share child rearing
responsibilities; giving fathers opportunities to develop close rela-
tionships with their children.98 Nonetheless, not one of these bene-
fits has received empirical support.
In addition to identifying the spurious nature of the intended
benefits, one may question the basis of an entire program that os-
tensibly helps fathers who neither want to be helped nor want to
have relationships foisted upon them. Even if one would grant that
some fathers do not want to shun responsibility,99 and that such
Even if she does win, the welfare system is more likely to impose artificially low
support orders. Harris, supra note 38, at 625-26.
96. See S. Rep. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. at 2 (1974).
97. 120 Cong. Rec. H 4182 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1974) (statement of Rep. Pettis).
Some legislators claimed that assignment would protect the mother from retaliatory
action or harassment by the absent parent. E.g., 120 Cong. Rec. S 40,324 (daily ed.
Dec. 17, 1974) (statement of Sen. Long).
98. Harris, supra note 38, at 651-52; tenBroek, supra note 24; see also TAx RE-
FUND OFFSET PROGRAM FOR DELINQUENT STUDENT LOANS AND CHILD SUPPORT PAY-
MENTS: HEARINGS ON S. 150 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE OF THE SENATE FINANCE Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 89-90 (1983)
(statement of Dan Copeland) (stating that the reforms have the potential for ex-
panding the number of parents that will want to use child support because cases
that were deemed uncollectable in the past will now produce results); POTENTALA
INEQUITIES AFFECTING WOMEN, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1983) (statement of Sue
Hunter) (stating that the implementation of an effective national support enforce-
ment program will in the long run save taxpayers the most money); Howard, supra
note 54, at 203-09 (reviewing the popularly asserted justifications for relative re-
sponsibility provisions and narrowing the main justifications to three: encourage
responsibility, strengthen and preserve family ties, save public welfare money).
99. This theme formed the basis for the men's rights movement. See Jerry W.
McCant, The Cultural Construction of Fathers as Nonparents, 21 FAM. L.Q. 127, 141-
42 (1987); Dan Menzie, Note, Fathers are Parents Too, 57 U.M.KC.L. REv. 963
(1989). This movement, as well as the general movement toward gender equality, is
largely responsible for the emphasis on joint custody and the increase in father's
visitation rights. FnEM supra note 23, at 81.
This increased awareness of father's rights and responsibilities has not gone un-
noticed in other fields. See FATHERHOOD AND FAMILIES IN CULTURAL CONTEXT 131-32
(Frederick W. Bozett & Shirley M.H. Hanson eds., 1991); MEN IN FAMILIES 131-212
(Robert A. Lewis & Robert E. Salt eds., 1986); Paula Allen-Mears, Adolescent Preg-
nancy and Parenting: The Forgotten Adolescent Father and His Parents, 3 J. [Soc.
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responsibility should be encouraged, there is a weakened rationale
for imposing a support obligation on absent parents. This is espe-
cially true in the case of unwed fathers who rarely seek social rela-
tionships with the children they are asked to support. The lack of a
social link or reciprocity between father and child has somewhat
different implications in the case of an unwed father who did not
have a relationship with his child than in the case of a father who
had such a relationship. The consistent relationship between a fa-
ther's willingness to pay support and the quality of his personal re-
lationship with his child'oo tells us something more than society
seems willing to accept.'o' Furthermore, the mere existence of a
biological link without a social link is curiously deemed sufficient to
justify imposing an unmitigated support obligation on the absent,
especially involuntarily absent, father. This is more curious given
that the Supreme Court has weaved a pattern of preference for the
social father-child relationship and has found that a genetic link
only offers the father the opportunity to develop a relationship with
his offspring.10 2 Lastly, the rationale as to why absent parents
could end up with support obligations larger than those imposed on
nonabsent parents remains unclear.103
WORK & HUM. SEx. 27 (1984) (advocating that the minor father and, more impor-
tantly, his parents take on some financial responsibility for his child); James Garba-
rino, Reinventing Fatherhood, 74 FAM. IN Soc. 51 (1993) (expanding on the notion
that the father's role is a social invention which relies on cultural perspective); Se-
bastian Kraemer, The Origins of Fatherhood: An Ancient Family Process, 30 FAm.
PRoc. 377 (1991) (tracing the evolution of fathers as the dominant parent); Kyle D.
Pruett, The Parental Presence, 74 FAM. IN Soc. 46 (1993) (demonstrating how men
and their children can profoundly affect each other).
Despite all the interest in men's rights and in giving them a fair deal, no one has
yet documented any significant changes in gendered behavior. Even though differ-
ences could be discerned, the ideology of patriarchy remains as the most instrumen-
tal force in the creation and acceptance of discourse about the family. Fineman,
supra note 27, at 289.
100. See Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 93, at 320; Frank F. Furstenberg,
Christine Whinquist Nord, James L. Peterson & Nicholaus Zill, The Life Course of
Children of Divorce: Marital Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 Am. Soc. REV. 656
(1983). See also JOHN H. BECKSTROM, EvOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE: PROSPECTS
AND LImnTAToNs ON THE USE OF MODERN DARWINISM THROUGHOUT THE LEGAL PRO-
CESS (1989) (a theoretical but empirically weak examination of the importance of the
parental social bond to the economic tie).
101. This is not necessarily to argue that fathers should be given greater visita-
tion or custody rights. For the dangers resulting from poor use of social science data
in family law, see FnaMiAN, supra note 23, at 113-14, 118, 124-25.
102. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S.
Ct. 2333 (1989).
103. See, e.g., Rawles v. Hartman, 527 N.E.2d 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), leave to
appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 410 (Ill. 1989) (court ordered an unmarried father to pro-
vide a college education for his nonmarital child; an obligation fathers who are mar-
ried and in an ongoing marriage relationship do not have). See generally Marvin M.
Moore, Parent's Support Obligations to Their Adult Children, 19 AKRON L. Rav. 183
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All existing data point to one conclusion: the reformed system
will not be cost effective and will not alleviate single mothers'
pains.' 0 4 In utilitarian terms, by not relieving poor mothers' pains
and by failing to alleviate the poverty of children, the justifications
offered for child support reforms are at best disingenuous. The fo-
cus (rationalization) has, to a large extent, come full circle: "bene-
fiting" father and child at the expense of the mother and taxpayer
dollars.
A plausible extrapolation for this failure is that the welfare
child support program, although cloaked in the rhetoric of public
service, exists to punish poor people rather than benefit them.
Lacking fiscal justification, the program seeks to punish men who
have children on welfare by making them pay society for their de-
sertion and bastardy. Equally plausible is the proposition that the
program, as usual, seeks to punish mothers for failing to keep a
man to support them.' 05 Viewed in this light, the rehabilitative
features continue to be mostly rhetoric.
The welfare system, then, has not moved beyond the worthy-
person standard as the Warren Court mandated.106 Will the Court
re-evaluate its premature conclusion? With the current composi-
tion of the Court, it is unlikely that it will. Even if the Court's com-
position were different, however, there is little reason to believe
that the result would differ. The next section will discuss the
Supreme Court's role in welfare reform by examining the Court's
apathy towards poor families, unwed fathers, and their claims of
equal protection.
II. The Judicial Response
In theory, there are several constitutional grounds upon which
statutes dealing with welfare rights may be challenged. Although
the Constitution is not a source of positive rights to wealth, the
(1985) (examining and evaluating the states' support laws in so far as they impose
an obligation on parents to provide financial assistance to their adult children).
104. In our attempt to emphasize the rights of unwed fathers, we should not belit-
tle the mother's side of the story. Single mothers, who are three times more likely to
become welfare recipients, report substantially higher rates of anxiety and depres-
sion than married mothers, use mental health facilities at a higher rate, have chil-
dren who do less well in school or obtain less desirable jobs, and have children who
also beget children early. See GARFIKL & McLANAAN, supra note 44, at 26-31.
See also Nan D. Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy: The Systematic Imposition
of Costs on Women, 6 HARv. WoMENds L.J. 1 (1983); FMEMAN, supra note 23.
105. Otherwise, if the establishment of paternity is so socially beneficial, why en-
force it against the welfare mothers' will and why not have a compulsory program for
all families?




Warren Court used the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause to impose constitutional constraints on the structure and ad-
ministration of governmental wealth transfers. Following the lead
of Goldberg v. Kelly,' 07 the Court might have chosen to oversee
wealth transfer programs to assure rationality in their structures,
and decency and fairness in their administration. Instead, the Bur-
ger Court abandoned the rhetoric of equal justice for the poor; rhet-
oric which promised more than the Warren Court had delivered and
far more than the Burger Court was prepared to provide in the
name of equal protection.10 8
In conjunction with its deflation of rhetoric, the Rehnquist
Court has recast what were originally equal protection and equal
access cases into a new mold of "minimal protection" and minimal
access.109 The compassion for the plight of the poor, which at least
informed and perhaps generated so many of the Warren Court's
holdings, has been replaced with a reluctance to tell the states how
to deal with the problems of the poor. The Rehnquist Court has
chosen to use neither the due process clause nor the equal protec-
tion clause to shape wealth transfer programs. By and large, the
Court has left the structure and process of these programs to fed-
eral, state, and local politicians and bureaucrats.ll 0
107. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that government benefits in the form of welfare
payments were interests in liberty and property, not merely privileges, and therefore
could not be terminated without procedural due process).
108. See infra notes 111-124 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
110. Several commentators have offered various approaches to deal with the
plight of the poor. These solutions, however, were even too optimistic for the liberal
Warren Court, let alone the conservative Rehnquist Court. Several have proposed
various ways in which the Constitution may be interpreted to grant a right to some
minimum level of material resources and thus require wealth transfers. See Charles
L. Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 1103 (1986) (arguing for a "constitutional justice of livelihood" using the 9th
Amendment); Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of
Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 877, 880-86 (1976) (interweaving both Rawl-
sian and libertarian principles to create an argument for a constitutionally guaran-
teed minimal level of material wealth); Frank I. Michelman, On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 9-13 (1969) (developing a
constitutional duty to satisfy the "just wants" of each person); Charles A. Reich, Be-
yond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BRoom L. Rav. 731
(1990) (exploring the consequences of governmental growth on the transformation of
property). See also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964)
(arguing that the moderate due process cost benefit approach to individual security
has failed, and that society must now make economic security a constitutional right);
William J. Brennan, Reason, Passion, and 'The Progress of the Law,' 10 CARDoZO L.
REV. 3 (1988) (examining the interplay of forces between applying pure reason to
legal problems and applying personal will or passion, and suggesting that this inter-
play is essential to the vitality of the judicial process); Peter B. Edelman, Essay: The
Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to The Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.
J. 1 (1987) (making an argument for a constitutional right to survival income); Brad-
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An analysis examining the willingness of the Court to inter-
vene on behalf of poor fathers best starts with an examination of
Dandridge v. Williams.",' That opinion is important for three rea-
sons: (1) it illustrates the usefulness of the morally unworthy-per-
son standard; (2) it reflects the futility of challenging
discriminatory welfare laws on equal protection grounds; and (3) it
exemplifies the recurring theme of judicial helplessness.
A. Accepting the Morally Unworthy-Person Standard
The Dandridge opinion is a striking model of the implicit ac-
ceptance of the morally unworthy-person standard. Maryland ar-
gued that the maximum grant ceiling provided "incentives for
family planning," thus providing a rationale for discriminating
among AFDC recipients.112 The argument rests on stereotypical
images of welfare mothers procreating irresponsibly. Since these
women become pregnant because of moral weaknesses, the grant
ceiling encouraged them to do the right thing and have no more
children.ll3 Although Justice Stewart did not explicitly endorse
this argument in favor of the regulation, he recounted it as part of
the state's rationale for the regulation.S14 The family planning ar-
gument is based on the rhetorical theme of the moral weakness of
the poor.
ley R. Hogin, Equal Protection, Democratic Theory, and the Case of the Poor, 21
RUTGERS L. J. 1 (1989) (arguing that the prevailing form of equal protection review,
by excluding republican and participatory models, imposes an overly narrow heuris-
tic vision of political process); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitu-
tional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 659 (responding to objections made to his
prior welfare rights thesis that there should be a constitutional right to certain basic
ingredients of individual welfare); William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in
the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1431 (1986) (discussing substantive connota-
tions of the notion of a "right" that has dominated liberal discussions of the welfare
system); William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD.
L. REV. 1 (1985) (contrasting the jurisprudence of welfare entitlement developed by
social workers during and after the New Deal with the lawyers' welfare jurispru-
dence of the past two decades); William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class
in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L. J. 1198 (1983) (examining the relation of contem-
porary legal discourse to the institutional and social developments of the welfare
system); William L. Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the Poor,
95 YALE L. J. 1700 (1986) (retrospectively examining the effectiveness of Brown v.
Board of Education, the current vitality of its principles, and its continuing
reference).
111. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
112. Id. at 484.
113. Even assuming that the state could encourage mothers to "do the right
thing," it is not clear that mothers would be acting morally: they would be reacting
to the state's financial incentives rather than individual moral sources.
114. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 484.
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The regulation further assumes that the poor are poor by
choice. The linchpin of Justice Stewart's opinion was the asserted
need for a "semblance of an equitable balance between families on
welfare and those supported by an employed breadwinner."ll 5
This argument depends on the creation of two categories of fami-
lies: "welfare families" and "wage earner families." It also rests on
the need for a balance between the two. The "welfare family" must
not be financially better off than the "wage earner family." Ostensi-
bly, such a system must exist in order to maintain a level of welfare
sufficiently unattractive so as to assure the continued supply of
cheap labor that the economy demands."l 6
The only way that the economic status of a family is an appro-
priate basis for desert is if a welfare family is somehow responsible
for its status. In other words, a welfare family has choices and its
behavior explains its poverty. This has become the most common
account for the welfare family's moral weakness: poor people
choose to shirk employment and would rather be welfare depen-
dents than become independent wage earners.
The Court's acceptance of this argument was reemphasized in
Jefferson v. Hackney,ll7 where the Court again rejected an equal
protection argument challenging the Texas AFDC program. "18 The
Court found that in order to limit its public assistance expendi-
tures, a state could reduce the amount paid to AFDC recipients by
25 percent while reducing the amount given to the blind and dis-
abled by 5 percent and by not reducing the amount given to the
aged at all."l9
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist argued that Texas
officials rationally might
have concluded that the aged and infirm are the least able of
the categorical grant recipients to bear the hardships of an in-
adequate standard of living... that the young are more adapta-
ble than the sick and elderly, especially because the latter have
less hope of improving their situation in the years remaining to
them.120
Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[w]hether or not one agrees
with this state determination, there is nothing in the Constitution
115. Id. at 486.
116. See id. ("It is enough that a solid foundation for the regulation can be found
in the State's legitimate interest in encouraging employment and in avoiding dis-
crimination between welfare families and the families of the working poor.").
117. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
118. Id. at 537-38.
119. Id. at 545-56.
120. Id. at 549.
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that forbids it."121 Once again the background assumption under-
lying the Jefferson analysis of the Texas law is that notwithstand-
ing the existence of appropriate and sensible employment
opportunities, the AFDC poor chose to be on public assistance
rather than earn an honest living. Much like Justice Stewart's
opinion in Dandridge,122 Rehnquist's opinion in Jefferson did not
explicitly comment on the moral weakness of the poor. Yet the
rhetoric of both opinions draws its power from that implicit prem-
ise. Just as Stewart's assertion of the need for an equitable balance
between welfare families and wage earner families depended on an
assumption of relative worthiness between us and them,123 Rehn-
quist's construction of the rationale behind the Texas scheme de-
pended on the assumption that able-bodied poor people shirk work.
In Bowen v. Gilliard,124 the Court reaffirmed its view that in
the eyes of the law, poor people are poor by choice. In Gilliard, the
Court found that the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), which
required that the income of all family members be included in a
filing unit, was violative of neither Fifth Amendment due process
nor equal protection principles.125 Congress could rationally adjust
the AFDC program to reflect that support money for a single child
generally provides significant benefits for entire family units.' 26
The Court concluded by finding that the state had not unconstitu-
tionally taken the petitioner's property: "[t]he law does not require
any custodial parent to apply for AFDC benefits."127
In essence, and as Justice Brennan argued in dissent,128 the
Gilliard Court found that a state could reasonably condition an in-
digent mother's welfare eligibility on her child surrendering a vital
connection with either its father or its mother. Indigent fathers
have two choices: reimburse the government or have the mother
121. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972).
122. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 496 (1970).
123. Id. at 486.
124. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
125. Id. at 592. In dissent, Justice Brennan also noted that it was "true that ben-
efits to other household members may redound to the benefit of the child... [but
that] there must be some limit to such attribution of benefits. . . ."Bowen, 483 U.S.
at 630 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the Supreme Court found that the
state law required that child support be used solely for the benefit of the child, it
further held that the government could include that child support amount in the
determination of the AFDC grant and, thus, deny benefits to the entire family. Id.
at 607-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 592.
127. Id. at 608 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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relinquish custody. Fathers are more likely to pay the government
- the least costly alternative.129
It is important to emphasize that fathers were not repre-
sented' 3 0 and accordingly, the majority opinion in Gilliard did not
consider the rights of custodial fathers. The Gilliard majority
failed to address the DEFRA amendment's impact on a father's en-
titlement to care for his children's unique needs and right to sus-
tain131- a relationship with them. Although it is interesting to
speculate how the Court would have factored in a noncustodial fa-
ther's rights, the Court's approach is clear: such a father's rights
are not to be considered.132
B. Denying Putative Father's Rights
The Supreme Court has been willing to extend visitation/cus-
tody protections to unwed fathers and their illegitimate children,
but only when a substantial psychological/social relationship ex-
isted.133 Despite high tributes, this line of cases extending parental
rights to unwed fathers was not the turning point for which so
many had hoped. The rights of unwed fathers' have proved to be
quite vulnerable.
129. Id. at 623 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The financial and emotional cost of los-
ing this connection with the father may be too much for the child to bear. If so, the
only way to avoid it is for the child to leave the custody of the mother.... The burden
of this choice hardly requires elaboration.").
130. The attorneys for the appellees represented the interests of the children re-
ceiving child support, custodial mothers, and indigent siblings receiving AFDC. Id.
at 590 n.3. The National Organization for Women (NOW) filed an amicus brief. Id.
at 589. No men's organization or father's rights group, however, filed such a brief.
This supports the assertion that Men's rights groups are not concerned with indigent
men.
131. Emphasis should be placed on the term "sustain," since a father's right to a
relationship with his child(ren) seemingly comes into consideration when the father
has shown investment. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
132. The Court had ample opportunity to do so; Justice Brennan's dissent went to
a great length in demonstrating the precedents that granted constitutional protec-
tion to father's rights, as well as a host of social and psychological literature that
would show the negative consequences of eliminating a father's provider role, i.e.,
the total withdrawal from the relationship. Although this writer does not agree with
this assessment, others have. E.g., The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, 101 HARv.
L. REv. 119, 270-80 (1987).
133. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that an unwed father, who
had lived with the mother of his children for 18 years prior to her death, has a consti-
tutional right to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before the children could be
removed from his care); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding that a
statute that allowed an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adop-
tion of their children by withholding consent found to violate the father's right to
equal protection; note that the father had maintained a relationship with his chil-
dren for 4 years after his separation from the mother).
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When putative fathers have never had any actual or legal cus-
tody of their children, their rights have been easily outweighed.134
Likewise, when a mother is married to another man, the putative
father's relationship with his child is of no significance. For exam-
ple, in Michael H. v. Gerald D. the Court found that a putative fa-
ther who had formed a relationship with and provided economic
support for his child born out of wedlock was not allowed to con-
tinue the relationship with his child; principally because the
mother had returned to her estranged husband.135
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has never
found a father's fundamental right to a relationship with his child
born out-of-wedlock.136 The Court has only recognized a substan-
tial liberty interest in relationships between a natural father and
his children when the parents had been married. 137 In this man-
ner, the Court has only applied a rational basis test to cases involv-
ing unmarried fathers.
In Lehr v. Robertson,13s the Court explicitly stated that "[i]f
one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child
and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a
relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a State
from according the two parents different legal rights."13 9 The Lehr
Court applied the same test it had applied a decade earlier in
Parham v. Hughes,140 where the Court concluded that "mothers
and fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated,"141
and therefore may be differentially treated.
134. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983).
135. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Not all commentators, however, agree that the Michael
H. decision was as restricted as this writer believes it to be. For different interpreta-
tions and higher hopes, see David Line Batty, Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The
Constitutional Rights of Putative Fathers and a Proposal for Reform, 32 B. C. L. REV.
1173 (1990); Elizabeth A. Hadad, Note, Tradition and the Liberty Interest: Circum-
scribing the Rights of the Natural Father, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 291 (1990); Gail A.
Secor, Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: Due Process and Equal Protection Rights of
Unwed Fathers, 17 HAsTINGs CONST. L. Q. 759 (1990); Joan C. Sylvain, Note,
Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Presumption of Paternity, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 831
(1990). But see, Carol Lynn Tebben, A Father's Right: Some Inconsistencies in the
Application of Due Process and Equal Protection to the Male Parent, 4 AMER. J. OF
FAm. L. 139 (1990) (arguing that, for many fathers seeking to protect the relation-
ship with a child, the 14th Amendment has proven to be meaningless).
136. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 124.
137. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (holding that divorced fathers have
a liberty interest in the preservation of visitation rights sufficient to warrant proce-
dural protection).
138. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
139. Id. at 267-68.
140. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
141. Id. at 355
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Viewing these Supreme Court cases in their entirety, a
mother's unilateral action of marrying another man automatically
cuts off the biological father's rights to his child, even though the
father may desire to know, nurture, love and support his child.
Furthermore, since states may allow a mother to rebut the pre-
sumption of legitimacy and establish paternity in the biological fa-
ther, she may force legal obligations to the child upon the biological
father.X4 2
In a significant number of states, biological fathers have been
denied the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, even
though the presumed father, the mother, and sometimes the child,
have that right.143 In other states the presumption of legitimacy
142. The Stanley line of cases has received a great deal of attention from commen-
tators and prompted many states to revise their statutory schemes. See, e.g., Eliza-
beth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr
v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 313 (1984); Sharon Nelson Freytag, Equal Protection
and the Putative Father: An Analysis of Parham v. Hughes and Caban v. Moham-
med, 34 Sw. L. J. 717 (1980); Lisa Weinhaus, Substantive Rights of the Unwed Fa-
ther: The Boundaries Are Defined, 19 J. FAm. L. 445 (1980-81); John T. Wright,
Comment, Caban v. Mohammed: Extending the Rights of Unwed Fathers, 46 BRooK.
L. REV. 95 (1979-80); Deborah Davis Alleman, Note, Adoption: The Constitutional
Rights of Unwed Fathers, 40 LA. L. REv. 923 (1979-80); Katherine L. Corley, Com-
ment, Removing the Bar Sinister: Adoption Rights of Putative Fathers, 15 CumB. L.
REV. 499 (1984-85); Mary M. DeMarco, Note, Delineation the Boundaries of Putative
Fathers' Rights: A Psychological Parenthood Perspective, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 290
(1985); Mary M. Horton, Comment, Domestic Relations - Parental Rights of the Puta-
tive Father: Equal Protection and Due Process Considerations, 14 Mam. ST. U. L.
REv. 259 (1984); Rona Klein, Note, Putative Fathers: Unwed, but No Longer Unpro-
tected, 8 HosTrA L. REV. 425 (1979-80); Jennifer J. Raab, Note, Lehr v. Robertson:
Unwed Fathers and Adoption - How Much Process is Due?, HARv. WOMEN's L. J. 265
(1984); Mary F. Radford, Note, Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - Caban v.
Mohammed, 29 EMORY L. J. 833 (1980); Juliann J. Sitoski, Note, Limiting the
Boundaries of Stanley v. Illinois: Caban v. Mohammed, 57 DENY. L. J. 671 (1980);
Developments in Law - the Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156
(1980); Supreme Court Review: 1978-79 Term - Caban v. Mohammed, Parham v.
Hughes, 7 HASTINGS CoNsT. L. Q. 445 (1980).
143. See, e.g., Shereece B. v. Donald W., 231 Cal. App. 3d 613 (1991) (A natural
father is not denied equal protection when his parental rights were terminated, even
when he had taken steps to forge a relationship. The legislature may distinguish
between presumed and natural fathers and accord presumed fathers greater rights
than natural fathers; in this instance, it may offer a hearing to determine the best
interests of the child when a presumed father is involved, but not when it is only a
natural father). For an analysis of various state approaches, see Ann Minnick
Wheeler, A Father's Right to Know His Child: Can it Be Denied Simply Because the
Mother Married Another Man?, 20 LoY. L-A. L. REv. 705 (1987).
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) at § 4(a)(1) (1990), has adopted the middle
approach: although the presumption is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence,
it is not rebuttable by a man wishing to establish paternity when another man is
presumed to be the father. This is true despite the UPA's explicit claim that marital
status is irrelevant in the establishment of a relationship between parent and child.
Id. at § 3. The Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act (UPIFA), at § 2(a)
(1990), provides that a putative father may bring an action to determine whether he
is the father of a particular child, but that it must be done in accordance with appli-
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remains rebuttable.144 Some states, however, have statutorily rec-
ognized unwed fathers as "parents."145 Nonetheless, no state has
extended substantial substantive parental rights to unwed fathers
as a class.146 If they do extend rights, it is only to those fathers who
have taken certain steps toward legitimizing their child or if it is in
the child's best interests. 147
C. The Recurring Theme of Judicial Helplessness
The Dandridge opinion148 is also significant for illustrating
the recurring theme of judicial helplessness. Justice Stewart ac-
knowledged that in some AFDC families no person may be employ-
able.149 He further explained,
[i]t is also true that with respect to AFDC families whose deter-
mined standard of need is below the regulatory maximum, who
therefore receive grants equal to the determined standard, the
employment incentive is absent. But the Equal Protection
Clause does not require that a State must choose between at-
tacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem
at all. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61. It is
enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination. The regulation before us meets that
test. 150
Justice Stewart also noted that the Court did not decide
that the Maryland regulation is wise, that it best fulfills the
relevant social and economic objectives that Maryland might
ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane system could
not be devised .... But the intractable economic, social, and
even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assist-
ance programs are not the business of this Court.... [T]he Con-
stitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state
officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating
cable state law. The UPUFA, however, would give the unknown fatheT substantial
rights in judicial proceedings for adoption or termination of parental rights, a right
which may even require a judge to use "publication or public posting of notice." Id.
at § 3(g).
144. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 118-21 (1988); John Law-
rence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a 'Parent'? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 372-82 (1991); Maijorie Maguire Shultz,
Reproductive Technology and Intent-based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender
Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297; John R. Hamilton, Note, Rebutting the Marital
Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 369 (1988).
145. See John R. Hamilton, Note, The Unwed Father and the Right to Know of His
Child's Existence, 76 Ky. L.J. 949, 981-85 (1987-88).
146. Wheeler, supra note 143, at 705-06 nn.3-4.
147. Id. at 740.
148. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
149. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1990). Here, the Court offhand-
edly notes that no family members of any of the named plaintiffs in the present case
were employable. Id.
150. Id. at 486-87.
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limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential
recipients. 151
The above passages contain a dual message of helplessness. Stew-
art and his colleagues chose not to use their available power to de-
mand a real measure of wisdom, justice and humanity in the
Maryland welfare program. Instead, they chose to demand only the
formality of minimal rationality. Stewart also argued the helpless-
ness of us all by his reference to the "intractable economic, social,
and even philosophical problems" of poverty and welfare and the
"myriad of potential recipients."152 In the Supreme Court's vision,
the problem of poverty and welfare is dauntingly too complex and
the poor simply overwhelm the finite resources available for their
assistance. The assumption is that the Court must either be in the
business of restructuring the entire welfare system, or stay out of
the area altogether.
The majority's test and assertion of helplessness, as expressed
in Dandridge, became the rhetoric of the Court's subsequent AFDC
cases. The Court has continued to profess its helplessness and has
validated welfare structures that have lacked wisdom, justice, and
humanity but have nevertheless met the Court's criteria of ration-
ality. In this vein, Justice Rehnquist concluded his Jefferson opin-
ion by "re-emphasiz[ing] what the Court said in Dandridge v.
Williams... '[T]he intractable economic, social, and even philosoph-
ical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are
not the business of the Court."15 3 In other words, the Court is sim-
ply not in the business of assuring wisdom, justice, and humanity in
the realm of welfare and poverty.
In Gilliard, the Court reiterated not only its helplessness, but
also its seeming lack of concern:
[A] number of needy families have suffered, and will suffer, as a
result of the implementation of the DEFRA amendments to the
AFDC program. Such suffering is frequently the tragic by-
product of a decision to reduce or to modify benefits to a class of
needy recipients. Under our structure of Government, how-
ever, it is the function of Congress - not the courts - to deter-
mine whether the savings realized, and presumably used for
other critical governmental functions, are significant enough to
justify the costs to the individuals affected by such
reductions.154
151. Id. at 487.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 551 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)); see
supra notes 117-121 and accompanying text.
154. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 596 (1987).
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The Gilliard court concluded by adopting the Dandridge standard:
"the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess...
officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating lim-
ited public welfare funds." 155 The Court surrendered its responsi-
bility for the poor.
Conclusion
Social concerns have always played a critical role in determin-
ing the content of laws dealing with the poor. In the Family Sup-
port Act we see how these concerns remain determinative in
molding the character and fixing the features of attempts to deal
with complex societal problems. Now, however, it seems that we
are witnessing how fiscal considerations have become secondary to
punitive, moralistic, and political motives. Legislators currently
dealing with restructuring this nation's welfare system have ig-
nored how these motives may be at work, especially when dealing
with unwed, indigent fathers.
In this article, we have seen how the dual rhetoric of moral
weakness and judicial helplessness fits the needs of a Court that
has chosen to minimize the constitutional basis for intervention on
behalf of the poor. Under this rhetoric, either the poor are unde-
serving of the Court's intervention or, if they do come close to de-
serving protection because they are not treated equally, the Court
becomes functionally helpless to do justice. The Court is willing to
terminate an unwed father's right to contact with his child, but not
his obligation to provide support. The implementation of welfare
policies, then, is likely to remain in the hands of state officials
guided by failing legislative initiatives.
The troubling aspect of the recent legislative reforms and the
Court's stance is not that they allow unequal treatment. The Fam-
ily Support Act is only a manifestation of general dissatisfaction
with the welfare system - its increasing rolls and increasing costs.
As each step to reverse or slow the trend proves to be unsuccessful,
legislators vainly seek to strengthen their control, impose stricter
standards, exclude, stigmatize, and privatize. This trend continues
while reformers are increasingly unwilling to examine the theories
underlying their laws and blindly pursue a course begun in the van
belief that it is the details that foil them, rather than their basic
premise. What is most troubling is that as the legislature sterc an
increasingly unjust course, the Supreme Court is no longer tihere ,o
guide.
155. Id. at 609; Dandridge v, Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
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Recent developments in welfare reform aimed at indigent fa-
thers have not been accidental; they have been coupled with a shift
in jurisprudence and a return to rhetoric most thought the Court
had reversed and Congress had abandoned. Unfortunately, the leg-
islature is no longer guided by its own rules, which had "determined
that immorality and illegitimacy should be dealt with through re-
habilitative measures." 156 The Court has also adopted the legisla-
ture's rhetorical themes and attached its own. The morally
unworthy face judicial helplessness..
In the end, we return to the words of the inflamed dissenter in
Humphrey, who thought that an unwed father should be held finan-
cially responsible for an entire family simply because one of the
children was allegedly his.157 In arguing that any other result
would work a great injustice to taxpayers who would not be reim-
bursed for AFDC payments made to the family, the dissenter pro-
tested, [i]n choosing whether the [immoral, irresponsible] father of
this child or the taxpayers of this state should benefit, my vote is for
the taxpayers." 158
156. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 310 (1968).
157. Humphrey v. Woods, 583 N.E. 2d 133, 136 (Ind. 1991) (Krahulik, J., dissent-
ing). See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
158. Id. (Krahulik, J., dissenting).
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